Note and Comment by Bates, Henry M. et al.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 7 
1921 
Note and Comment 
Henry M. Bates 
University of Michigan Law School 
Lewis H. Mattern 
University of Michigan Law School 
Paul W. Gordon 
University of Michigan Law School 
Jean Paul Thomas 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry M. Bates, Lewis H. Mattern, Paul W. Gordon & Jean P. Thomas, Note and Comment, 19 MICH. L. REV. 
728 (1921). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol19/iss7/5 
 
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MICHIGAN ·LAW REVIEW 
naLllJlllD KOWTBLT DtlllIKG TBS ACADnilC -rus, UCl.1JSIV& O• ocro:aa, ST TS• 
~W SCHOOL OF THIE UNIVDISITY OF MICHICAN 
•U••c•1irr1011 PIUCE ···•o .!'Ell YE.1111. 
RALPH w . .Al:GLSR, EDITOll-IN-CHW 
ASSOCIATS SDITOJlS 
IUNllY M. BAttS 
E. C •. Gl:JDDARD 
EDSON .R. SUNDULAND 
JossPH H. DRAKE 
JOHN B, WAITS 
STUDSNTS~ Al'l'OINTSD BY THS l'ACUI.TY 
HUMAN A. AUGUST, of Michigan 
OLIVEN. BA».TON, of Michigan 
A. GEOllGE BouCHAllD, of Wisconsin 
ALAN W •. BoYD, of Indian& 
D. HALs BliJCE, of Michigan· 
CUL G. Bunor, of Michigan 
Flll!!DElllCK D. CAlloLL, of Michigan 
GEOllGE D. CLAPPUTON, .of Michipn 
RALPH E. GAULT, of Michigan 
PAUL w. C".OIU>ON, of Illinoia 
CaAJU:£S F 
JAMES I. McCLtNToci, of C-qloUd<> 
LEWIS H •. MATTDN, of Ohio 
WILLIAM C. O'Kun:, of Michigan 
Louis A. Pilxu, of Iowa 
HA"OLD M. SHAPDo, of Michipii" 
H.ubLn. R. SMITH, of: Michigan 
WtNTEJt N. SNow, of Maine 
EDWIN B. STASON, of Iowa 
JEAlf Pf.UL THOKAN, of Michigan 
GLENN A. TnvoJJ, of Illiuoia 
TuuDt; _of Illinoia 
NOTE AND COMMENT 
FRS£DOM oF Piu;:ss AND Uss oF THS MAILS.-Strangely enough, the First 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, although it giiarantees against fed-
erai attack highly important and fundamen,tal rights, has received very little 
authoritative interpretation by our courts. It remained for the Gr&t War 
and conditions following in its train to bring before that tribunal almost the 
first really important controversies relating to freedom of press and of .. speech. 
The case of U.S. ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Company, 
Plaintiff in Error, v. Postmaster-General Albert S. Burleson, decided 
' March 7, 1921, is the- latest of a s~ries of notable cases concerning this im-
portant matter .. The case, however, adds little to the development of the 
subject by the court in the preceding cases in this group, which have been 
reviewed in an article by Professor Goodrich, 19 MICHIGAN LAW RsVISW, 
pages 487-501. 
In the group of recent cases referred to, a divergence .o(opinion among 
the judges themse!ves had appeared. In Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47, 39 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 247, in the unanimous opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes, 
the ti:st of liability for speech was expressed as follows: · 
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"The question in ev~ry case is whether the words are used in such cir-
cumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger 
that they will bring about the suostantive evils that Congress had a. right 
to prevent." 
This would seem to be ;i definite rejection of "the tendency" or "in-
direct causation" tests and the court adhered to this view in two cases de-
cided shortly thereafter. Frohwerk v. U. S., 249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. St. Rep: 249; 
and Debs v. fl. S., 24g U.S. 2n, 39 SuP.. Ct Rep. 252. The Debs case, particu-
larly, has been criticized on the ground that it did not apply the' test as stated 
above to the facts in the case. (See references in Professor Goodrich's article 
above referred to, 19 MICH. L. Rtv. 487, 492. See also the book of Professor Z. 
Chafee, Jr., "FRE!m<>M : OF SPE£CH," 90-93.) Other cases. in which the court 
appeared to adhere to its statement of the test in the Schenck case are re-
ferred to, 18 MrcH. L. Rev. 490, n. 12. But on March 8, 1920, the court an-
nounced the decision in Pierce v. U. S., 252 U. S. 239, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205, 
in which as pointed out by Professor Goodrich in the article before referred 
to, Justice Pitney, writing the opinion for the court, declares the doctrines 
!mown as "indirect causation" and "constructive intent" as the basis of lia-
bility. It will be seeri from this brief review of the cases that the court is 
divided in opinion and that it cannot be said with confidence that any test 
of liability has been definitely and permanently adopted by the court. 
In the case decided March 7th, 1921, freedom of the press is discussed 
especially by Justice Brandeis, in a vigorous and able dissenting opinion, but 
the case has brought the court no nearer to a final position as to what is the 
"freedom of press" guaranteed by the First Amendment. A majority of the 
court sustain the Postmaster-General in revoking the second-class mail priv-
ilege which had been granted to the publisher of the Milwaukee Leader, some 
years before. That revocation was put upon the ground that as shown by the 
utteranc;es of the paper during the six months after the United States had 
entered the war, the journal was !}editious, violative of Section I of Title XII 
of the Act of June 15, 1917, known as "The Sedition Act"; that it had ceased 
to be "mailable matt~r'' under the Congressional law. providing for the classifi-
cation of mails; and that the Postmaster-General's decision as t~ these points 
was conclu~ive, unless a wanton or very clear case of abuse of authority by 
him were shown. 
The alleged objectionable matter printed in the newspaper published by 
the relater in this case is characterized by Mr. Justice Clark as "not designed 
to secure amendment or repeaf of the laws denounced in them as arbitrary 
and oppressive, but to create hostility to, and to encourage violation of, 
them. * * * Without further discussion of the articles, we can not doubt 
that they conveyed to readers of them, false reports and false statements with 
intent to promote the success of the enemies of the United States, and that 
they constituted a wiiJful attempt to cause disloyalty a~d refusal of duty in 
the military and naval forces and to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment 
service of the United States, in violation of the Espionage Law, and that 
therefore . their publication brought the paper containing them within the 
express terms of Title XII of that law, declaring that such a publication shall 
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be 'non-mailable' and 'shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from 
any postoffice or by any letter carrier.'" 
The excerpts from the paper quoted by Mr. Justice Clarke seem to bear 
out all that he sa~ of them and it can scarcely be doubted that they were 
seditious and that they did tend to obstruct the government in -the prosecu-
tion of the war. The question remains; however, whether the Postmaster-
Gencral had authority to deal with "the matter as he did. In. his dissent, Mr. 
Justice Brandeis denies that Congress had conferred authority upon the Post-
master-General to revoke or suspend the second-class miil privilege in such 
case, and in this respect the dissent seems to be upon solid ground. There 
are at least three distinct questions in the case: 
First.-Were the expressions in the Milwauke~ Lr:adcr, referred to by the 
court. seditious or otherwise illegal? 
Second.-If there were seditious expressions in the paper, could it be 
excluded altogether from the mails, in futuro f 
Third.-Did the Postmaster-General have authority to revoke the second· 
class maiiing privilege because of seditious or illegal utterances? 
The majority of the court answer the first and third of these questions 
in the affirmative and so decide the case. Mr. Justice Brandeis answers the 
second and third in the negative, and discusses but does not finl!-llY answer 
the first, obviously because he does nr· think it necessary to a correct Q.ecision. 
If we concede that the utterances complain~d of were seditious, it by no 
means follows that -the Postmaster-General had the right to take the action 
adopted in this case. No statute expressly gives him such authority. Con-
gress has classified the mail into first, second, third and fourth classes, not 
with reference to the legal; ethical, or patriotic qualities of written or printed 
matter, but with reference to the size, periodicity and other external or me-
chanical attributes. There would seem· no warrant whatever for the revoca-
tion of a granted privilege in-one of these classes, for reasons which had 
nothing whatever to do with the classification. True, the permit issued recitt!s 
"that the authority herein given is revocable ·upon determination by the de-
partment that the publication does not conform to law"; but a revocation 
limited only to one class of mail, to be valid ought to be based upon some 
violation of law touching the basis of the particular class of mail affected. A 
violation of law by a publisher, which goes to the fundamental character qf 
the publication, may give ground for pr'osecution or for total exclusion from 
the- mails; but to permit the Postmasier-General to have final determination 
in such decision and action as was involved in this case would open the door 
perhaps to all of the dangers pictured by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his vigorous 
opinion. 
Upon the larger question as to whether the practical suppression of this 
paper involved ari illegal abridgment of freedom ·of the press, it may well be 
doubted whether Mr. Justice Brandeis is upon sure ground. What would 
be permissible freedom of press and speech in peace time obviously would 
not- necessarily be such during the emergency of a world war. Those who 
argue· that constitutional guaranties, including the First Amendment, imply 
. . 
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the necessity of an unalterable attitude during all conditions, on the one hand, 
or as the only other alternative, the complete abandonment of such consti-
tutional guaranties during time of war, -show little knowledge of our consti-
tutional law and its development during recent years at the hands, among 
others, of the two Justices, Brandeis and Holmes, dissenting in this case. 
See, for example, the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v. 
Haskell, 219 U.S. 104. 31 Sup. Ct. I86, and Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Fran-
circo, 216 U. S. 358, especially pages 364-66. See also E. S. Corwin in 30 
YALE ·L. JouR. 48; Carroll, "Freedom of Speech and Press in the Federalist 
}>eriod," I8 MICH. L. -REY. 6I5; Wigmore, I4 Iu .. L. REv. 539; Goodrich, 19 
MICH. L. REv. 487; Cha fee, 32 HARV. L. REY. 932. Upon the fundamental 
question here involved, this REVIEW plans to make a more comprehensive 
statement, in the near future. H. M. B. 
WoRKHEN's COMPENSATION-COMPULSORY STATUTES AND DuE PROCESS.-
Modem workmen's compensation acts are of European inception, the first of 
them having been enacted in Germany in 1884. This has been amended and 
extended from time to time until as late as 19n. The British Compensation 
Act was passed by Parliament in 1897. Its scope has been greatly extended 
by amendments in 1900 and 1go6, and by supplemental legislation in 1912. At 
the present time compensation acts of one sort or another are in force in 
practically all the European countries. I BRADBUR¥'s WORKMAN'S CoMPF.NSA-
'l'ION, (2nd ed.) 7 j BOYD, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 8. 
The moveme~t for the enactment of -such laws became widespread in the 
United States about the beginning of the present century, and bore first. fruit 
in the federal act of 1908, the Montana act of I909, and the first New York 
act of I9IO. The succeeding ten years have witnessed a very*extensive accept-
ance of the compensation idea, so that at present there are workmen's com-
pensation acts of various sorts upon the statute _books of more than thirty of 
our states. -
While the American statutes _present many types which differ more or 
less from one another yet all fall clearly into one or the other of two gen-
eral classes: (I) optional statutes, in which the employer docs not come 
under the act unless he so elects, but in which he is deprived of certain 
common law defenses in failure of such election; and -(2) compulsory statutes. 
The great majority of the state statutes are of the optional or elective variety, 
and siich laws have universally been upheld in the face of constitutional 
objections. L. R. A. I916A, 414 Compulsory statutes, on the other hand, 
have been enacted in but five st'ates,-New York (2 statutes), Washington, 
California, Montana and Ohio. It.is with this type of law that the present 
note has to do. and more particularly with the constitutional objection urged 
against such a~ts that .they ~ffect a taking of property without due process 
of law. · 
The first of-these statutes to receive judicial review was the· New York 
act of I910, (Laws of. 1910, c. 674), which came before the Court of Appeals 
in the case of Ives v. South Buffal-0 Ry. Co. (I911), 201 N. Y. 271. The con-
stitutionaiity of th~ act was attacked, under b~th the State and Federal Con-
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stitutions on the ground, i11ter alia, that it constituted a taking of property 
without due process of law. In holding the act invalid the court based its 
decision squarely upon the broad ground that the imposition upon the em-
ployer of.liability without fault was in derogation 'of the due process clause 
of the State Constitution, and that the statute was not justifiable as a valid 
exercise of the police power because it did not tend to contribute directly to 
the promotion of the general welfare. The act in question, which provided 
for direct payment by employers to their injured employees o,f the benefits 
provided therein, was also subject to the same objection which later proved 
the stumbling block of the Montana act, namely, that the employee's common 
law remedies against the employer were preserved, thus exposing the em-
ployer to a double liability. See Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement 
Co., post. But the court in the Iv~s Case made no point of this feature. Nor 
was the finding in this case in any sense an adjudication of the validity of 
the act under the 14th amendment of the Federal Constitution, although it 
has been sometimes cited in that regard. The court expressly say that Noble 
State Ba•1k v. Haskell, 219' U. S. 104; is controlling as to the federal aspect of 
the case, and further that a finding of invalidity under the State "'"nstitution 
is sufficient for the purposes of the decision. 
Four months after the decision in the Ives Case, the Supreme Court of 
Washington handed down a decision upholding the compensation act of that 
state, (Laws ;,f 19u,. p. 345), in State, ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen 
(19n), 65 Wash. 156. Instead of the direct paymen~ plan of the Ne~ York 
act this statute provided for compulsory payments into a state insl!rance fund. 
The only effect of this difference, as far as the constitutional question was 
concerned, was to give rise to an additional objection to the act which could 
not be made to the New York law, namely, that the statute takes the prop-
erty of one employer to pay the obligations of another. The court concedes 
at the outset that there is a basis in fact for both this objection and that 
other objection which was finally controlling in the Iv.es Case, that the statute 
imposed liability without fault. "But/' the court goes on to say, "These con-
tentions do not furnish an absolute test of the validity of the act. * * * The 
test of the validity of such a law is not found in the inquiry, Does it do the 
objectionable things? but is found rather in the inquiry, Is there no reason-
able ground to believe that the public safety, health or general welfare is 
promoted thereby?" In holding that public. welfare was promoted, by a re- . 
moval of the burden of industrial injuries from the workman and his depend-
ents, thus lessening indigency, and placing it upon the employer and through 
·him, by means of adjustment of the prices of his commodity, upon the con-
suming public, the court takes a stand shaI'ply at variance with that of the 
New York Court of Appeals in the Ives Case. It is not Jtecessary to the 
validity of a statute under .the police power, say the Washington Court, that 
it should be "directly designed to conserve health, safety, comfort, peace and 
order," but on the other hand, quoting from Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 
supra, "An ulterior public advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant 
taking of private proiierty for what, in its immediate purpose, is a private use." 
The Montana act, (Laws of 1909, c. &;, p. 81), was held invalid in Cun-
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11i11gliam v. ·Northwestern Improvement Co. (19u). 44 Mont. 18o, solely on 
the ground that it preserved to the employee his common law right of action 
against the employer for injuries due to the latter's negligence, and thus ex-
posed the employe~ to a double liability and so deprived him of the equal 
protection of the laws. As to the due process aspect of the case, the court is 
fully as broad in its views as• the Washington' Court in the Clausen Case, 
the opitiion in which is quoted from with approval and at consi!:lerable length. 
"Any kasure," 'says the court, "which tends to minimize indigency, of ne-
cessity raises the general standard of the people." The court also quotes with 
approval the comprehensive definition of police power laid down in the Nob le 
Bat1k Case by Justice Holmes in the following words: "It may be said in 
a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. 
(Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518.) It may be put forth in aid of 
what is sanctioned by usage, or he1d by the prevailing morality or strong and 
preponderant opinion to be greatly and im_mediately necessary to the public 
welfare." · 
The next case to arise was State of iVashington v. Mountain Timber Ca., 
decided by the Supreme ·court of Washington in 1913 and reported in 75 
Wash. 581. The decision in the state court amounts to nothing more than 
a reaffirmance ot the position taken in the Clausen Case. The case was taken 
to the Supreme Court of the United States on error, and the decision tpere 
will be considered presently. 
· In 1,915 the second New York compensation law, (Laws of 1914. c. 41), 
came before .the Court of Appeals and was upheltl in Jensen v. Southern 
Pacific Co:, 215 N. Y. 514 This.act provided for compulsory contribution to 
il state insurance fund except in cases of employers who· should insure with 
private indemnity companies or who should be shown to be of sufficient 
financial ability to render certain the payment by. them directly to their in-
jured emp,loyees of the benefits conferred ·under the act. The double liability 
objection was not present inasmuch as the liability pr~scribed in the act was 
made exdusive. Also, it is to be noted that by an amendment to the New 
York Constitution in 1913 compulsory compensation acts were expressly au-
thorized, so the due process question under the state constitution was elim-
inated. In passing upon the federal question the court considered itself bound 
by the decis:On in_ the Noble Ba,;k Case. Thus, the Jense~ Case, cannot be 
considered as being in conflict with the rves Case; and yet a decided change 
of attitude is apparent from an examination of the two opinions. \V.hile not 
expresslY. relinquishing the position that a statute must directly tend to pro-
mote the public welfare in order to be sustainable as a valid exercise of the 
police power, the court affirm that the act under consideration is sufficiently 
direct in its.application to such object to render it unobjectionable, which in 
effect amounts to the same thing. They say, "A compulsory scheme of insur-
ance to secure injured workmen in hazardous employments and their-depend-
ents from becoming objects of 'charity certainly promotes the "public welfare 
as direct!y as does an insurance of bank depositors from loss," (referring to 
the Noble Bank Case). 
The California: statute, (Stat. of 1913, p. 279), which, like the second New 
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York act, was passed pursuant to the autho.rity of a constitutional amend-
ment, was sustained in Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury (1915), 170 Cal. 
686. It provided for compulsory direct payment, with an option to insure in 
either a state fund or a private indemnity company. The court directs atten-
tion to the distinction taken in the Ives Case between the fellow-servant, con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk rules on one side, and the rule 
that fault on the part of the employer must be sho~n, on the other. "Why 
this distinction?" asks the court. "Is the latter doctrine ·any more sacred or 
inherently necessary than any of the former?'' The court thinks not, and is 
clear that there is no fundamental inhibition on the legislature in the one case 
any more than in the other. 
The first adjudication on any of these statutes in the Supreme Court of 
the United States was the decision in New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. White 
(1917), 243 U. S. 188, upholding the second New York act. The court con-
cedes that there is a taking, but justifies it as a proper exercise of the police 
power of the state. "And for this reason: The subject-matteF * i * is the 
matter of compensation for human life or limb l~st or disability incurred in 
the course of hazardous employment, and the pul>lic has a direct intere~. :::i 
this as affecting the commo~ welfare. * * * When the individual health, 
safety and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer. (Holden 
v. Hard~·. 16g U. S. 366.) * * * One of the grounds of its [the public's] con-
cern with the continued life and earning power of the individual is its interest 
in the prevention of pauperism, with its concomitants of vice and cdme." In 
holding that the statute is not arbitrary or unreasonable the court follows the 
reasoning of the Washington Court in the Clausen Case, naml:ly, that industry 
itself is responsible for the injuries to workmen and should therefore stand 
the burden imposed by such injuries. "The loss of earning power, * * * 
however it may be charged up, is an expense of the operation, as truly as 
the cost of repairing broken machinery or any other expe~se that is ordinarily 
paid by the employer." 
The Washington act was sustained by a divided court in Mountain Timber 
Co. v. State of Washington (1917), 243 U. $. 219, the Chief Justice and Jus-
tices McKenna, Van Devanter and MC:Reynolds disenting. If this act merely 
substituted one form of employer's liability 'for another the points raised 
against it would be sufficiently answered by the decision in New York Cent. 
Ry. Co. v. White, supra,. but the Washington law goes farther and enforces 
contribution from all designated employers regardless of whether injuries 
have occurred to their employees or not. This, in its practical operation, may 
often require the most careful employers to pay indemnity to the injured 
employees of their negligent competitors. The answer which the court makes 
!O this objection is· that the nature. of the industries embraced in the act is 
such that there =. in the nature of things, be no assurance of immunity 
from personal injuries, even in the most carefully managed plants. It there-
fore follows, in view of the unforeseeability of such accidents arrd the prac-
tical inability to insure against them by careful management, that it is neither 
arbitrary nor unreasorlable to place the burden of such accidents upon the in-
dustries as a whole, compelling each unit to contribufe its ratable share. To 
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the p_oint that such an arrangement is not novel in the law, the court cites a 
number of examples. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, supra, (all banks taxed to 
make up a fund out of ·which to reimburse depositors of a faiiing bank) ; 
Kane v. New Jersc.v, 242 U.S. 100, (automobile license tax to improve roads); 
Horn v. People, 4) M.ich. 183, (tax on dogs to create a fund out of which 
to pay sheep owners whose sheep are killed by dogs) ; Holst v. Roe, 39 Oh. 
St. 340, (same). 
The recent case of Thornton v. Duffy, (Sup. Ct., 1920), 41 Sup. St. Rep. 
137, brought before the court a question which, in its constitutional aspects, is 
110 different from that presented. in th; Mountain Timber Case. The Ohio 
\Vorkmen's Compensation Law was involved. This act, as originally passed 
( 103 Ohio Laws, 72), provided for compulsory contribution to a state insur-
ance fund except in cases of employers who should be shown to be of suffi-
cient financial ability to make direct payment to injured employees, which 
employer-s should, upon deposit of security with the Commission, be allowed 
to settle directly. Whether an employer in any given case was of the requisite 
financial ability was to be determined as a finding of fact by the Commission. 
lly § 22 of the act, the Commission was authorized to "at any time change 
or modify its findings of fact * * * if in its judgment such action is necessary 
or desirable to secure or assure a strict compliance with all of the provisions 
of this act." By an amendment in 1917, (107 Ohio Laws 159), the legislature 
withdrew. the privilege of direct payipent. from all employers who should in-
sure themselves in private indemnity companies or otherwise. The Commis-
sion accordingly changed certain of its findings of fact, and it was claimed 
that such changes, as well as the amendment in pursuance to which they 
were made, deprived employers who had made contracts of insurance of 
property without due process of law under the 14th amendment. (The state 
question is disposed of by a constitutional provision. Art. II, sec. 35.) After 
holding that the express reservation in § 22 authorized a withdrawal of the 
option of direct settlement, and that no inviolable property rights had been 
acquired by reliance upon its extension in the first instance, the court dis-
poses of the case very briefly upon the authority of the Mountain Timber Case. 
Statutes of the type of the second New York act would seem to be quite 
clearly justifiable under the police power as it has been understood. ·The 
object. is obviously of general concern, and it is neither arbitrary nor un-
reas•mable to require the industries causing the injuries to assume the burden 
ther • .>f. It is simply a substitution Clf one form of liability for another,-
merely a legislative change in the rules of law applicable to industrial acci-
dents,-and no person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him 
to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit. Munn v. Illinois, 94 
U.S. u3; Hurtado v. California, no U.S. 516. 
It .is not so easy, however, to justify the additional step of forcing an 
employer to contribute regardless of the effect of his plant in producing the 
injuries compensated, as is done in the \Vashington and Ohio acts. In its 
final analysis this is nothing less than taking the property of one employer 
to pay the obligations of another, and in its practical effect it must necessarily 
operate to force the careful employer to assist in maintaining his negligent 
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rival in business. To this objection the court in· the M ountafo Timber Case 
answer that such accidentS are inevitable even in the" most carefully managed 
plants and that it is therefore reasonable to impose the burden upon the in-
dustry as.a whole. With all due respect to the learned justice who delivered 
the opinion, the conclusion seems too broad to be sustained by the premise. 
Granting such injuries are inevitable, their frequency is certainly much higher 
in a negligently managed plant than in one which is carefully managed. The 
frequency of accidents can hardly be said to be uncertain in any given plant 
as compared with' any other plant. But even if such uncertainty does exist, 
the mer.e fact that such a comparison will show a higher frequency of acci-
dents in one plant than in another of approximately. the same size and equip-
ment would seem to make it· unreasonable to require contribution on any such 
basis as the payr~ll .of the plant. 
'The case of a tax on dogs to create a fund to reimburse sheep owners 
for -sheep killed by dogs offers no analogy, for here there is a very real 
difficulty, if not an impossibility, in tracing the source of "the damage sus-
tain~d. The. same. may be said of the automobile license case, where it is 
appar~tly impossible to determine in wha't proportion various automobile 
owners enjoy the highway. 
It has been suggested, (65 u. OF PA. L. R.Ev .. 682), that the Noble State 
Bank Case is distinguishable by reason of the mutual interdependence of 
banks,· by reason of which careless management in any one may ruin any 
other. But it is believed that as a matter of practical experience it is gen-
erally, .if not ·always, the bank in which negligent or dishonest methl)ds are· 
followed that becomes insolvent. This basis of distinction would therefore 
seem to be without merit. It is also pointed out in the same source that the 
regulation to which banks are subject guarantees a certain minimum of 
careful managemeni. in all banks, which is not the case in .industry generally. 
This objection can be overcome, and has already been overcome to a large 
extent, by legislative regulation of industry, principally by way of requiring 
the adoption and use of mechanical safety devices and other cautionary and 
preventative measures. Another writer has attempted to distinguish the cases 
on the ground that a bank can cause but one loss, it being then insolvent, 
while a particular industrial plant may continue to operate and cause succes-
sive losses. See 84 CENT. L. JouR. 245. This distinction, if it be one at all. 
goes· simply to the matter of degree, and it is impossible to see why st•"h a 
difference should make the arrangement arbitrary in one case and not in the 
other. It would seem that, although the Noble State Bank Case was a some-
what stronger case, it properly was considered as controlling in the Mountain 
Timber Case. What has been said in regard to the latter case is of course 
true with regard to Thornton v. Duffjr, supra, which was decided on grounds 
of stare decisis. 
That the decisions in these cases do effect an extension of the limits of 
the police power .and reduce the compass of rights protected by the due 
process clause of the constitution can hardly be doubted.. It may be said, and 
not without a semblance of reason, that such decisions effect an encroach-
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mcnt, the ultimate result of which may be to render the constitutional guar-
anties illusory or wholly to abrogate them. It seems a sufficient answer to 
say that if and when such a result is accomplished it will be because it is 
"the expression of social, economic and political conditions," and that "by 
the prevailing morality.-or strong and preponderant opinion" such guaranties 
are no longer·necessary. FRSUND, POLICS Pow:ER, § 3; Noble State Bank v. 
Haskell, supra. Nor should we deprecate the prospect of such a state of 
affairs, for after all "The substance of the law at any given time pretty 
nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be 
convenient." HoLMES, THE CoMMON LAW, p. 1: And "it is right that it should 
be so, for laws are made for man, not man for laws. L. H. M. 
RIGHT TO Sur: IN TORT FOR NEGLIGENT D£LAY OF INSURANCE AGENT IN 
FORWARDING APPLICATION TO HoME OFFICE.-In cases where an insurance 
agent negligently delays in sending in an application for an insurance policy 
to the home office, and the thing sought to be insured is destroyed before the 
application is acted upon, it would seem illogical to hold that there is a 
liability on the part of the company for such negligence of its agent. It is a 
well established rule that an insurance company may reject an application for 
insurance without giving any reason for so doing. That being so, it is diffi-
cult to see any basis for imposing a tQrt liability on the company for negligent 
delay in acting upon such an application. But on such a state of facts it has 
been held that the company was liable in a tort action brought by the appli-
cant, based upon the negligence of the agent in failing to forward the appli-
cation within a reasonable time. Boyer v. State Farmers' Mutual Hail Ins. 
Co., 86 Kan. 422. In that case Boyer applied for insurance on a growing 
crop of corn, against damages by hail. The agent negligently delayed in send-
ing in·the application, and in the meantime the crop was liestroyed by a hail-
storm. In allowing a recovery the court distinctly states that the action is 
not in contract, but is based upon the negligence of the company's agent in 
not forwarding ·the application until too late to be of any benefit to the 
applica~t. This decision was followed in Wilkin v. Capital Fire Ins. Co., 99 
Neb. 828, three justices dissenting, but the same court later reversed itself in 
Meyer v. Central State Life Ins. Co., 103 Neb. 64o. By: statute it may be 
provided that an application for such insurance shalt be deemed accepted 
unless rejected within a specified time. See Wanberg v. Ins. Co., (N. Dak.), 
I79 N. W. 666, 19 MicH. L. Rsv. 340. 
A further difficulty is presented where the application is for a policy of 
life insurance. Where the agent. in such a case, negligently delays in send-
ing in the application, and the applicant dies before his -application has been 
acted upon, it would seem that an action of tort, brought by the adminis-
trator of his estate, could not under any circumstances be maintained. And 
yet, on precisely that state of facts, the Supreme Court of Iowa a11owed a 
reC'overy by the administrator. Duffie v. Bankers Life Ass'n., 16o Ia. 19. In 
that case it was held that it is the duty of an insurance company to act 
promptly on an application for insurance, and to notify the applicant of its 
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action, and that where the company, either directly or through its agents, is 
negligent in this respect, it cannot avoid .responsibility by the fact that the 
application had not been received and acted upon prior to the applicant's 
death. This decision was favorably .. commented on in a note in 27 HARV. L. 
REv. 92. See also a note in I 1 MICH. L. REv. 6o6, where the writer, in com-
menting on the Duffie case, says, "but the novel feature of this case is the 
holding that an action ex delicto lies against the insurer. It would be a 
strange doctrine if ordinary private parties were held liable for negligence in 
failing to accept or reject a proposed offer." And indeed that does present a 
logical difficulty which the Iowa court apparently overlooked. An application 
for insurance is in reality nothing more than an offer on the part of the 
applicant to enter into a contract with the company, and it is difficult to see 
why the negligent delay of the company in failing either to accept or reject 
it should give rise to a tort liability for such delay. It would seem that the 
same difficulty would prevent a recovery in cases like the Boyer case, above 
cited, but the question does not appear to have been considered. 
But a greater obstacle in the way of a recovery in life insurance cases was 
brought out by the court in a recent Illinois decision. Bradley v. Federal Life 
Ins. Co., 129 N. E. 171. There the applicant was solicited by an agent of the 
defendant company to take out an accident policy. He accordingly filed an 
application and paid a sum of money to keep the policy in force for a period 
of three months. The agent negligently delayed in forwarding the applica-
tion, and in the meantime the applicant was accidentally killed. The admin-
istrator of his estate brought the action in tort to 'recover the amount of in-
surance which the decedent had applied for, basing his claim on the negligence 
of the agent. It was held that no right of action could accrue or survive to 
the administrator. The difficulty which the court deems insurmountable· is 
that if any right of action accrued at all, which point the court declines to 
decide, it would accrue to the applicant. and such a right of action could not 
survive his death. In commenting on D11ffee v. Bankers Life Ass'11., supra, 
the court says, "the question of the action accruing or surviving does not 
appear to have been raised.'. InQeed if the point had been raised it would 
be difficult to justify the decision on any logical basis. 
There is no question but that the action, if any does accrue in such a 
case, must be in tort, for clearly there is no contractual relationship, either 
express or implied, between the parties. The overwhelming weight of au-
thority is that the insurer is not liable ex contractu for such delays. N. W. 
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563; More v. N. Y. Bowery Ins. Co., 
130 N. Y. 537; Brink v. M. & F. M. N. Ins. Ass'ti., 17 S. D. 235. Further-
more it is clear that the action would accrue to the applicant, if to anyone, 
ahd under the well established rule that tort actions do not survive, it is-
indeed difficult to see how the administrator could 10gically be held to have a 
cause of action. Even to hold that a cause of action accrues to the applicant 
is impossible to justify on any logical basis, and a holding, not only that such 
a right of action accrues., but also that it survives the death of the applicant, 
is a doctrine not in conformity with reason or sound legal principles. 
P. W.G .• 
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VALIDITY OF STATUTE REQUIRING HOTELS, RESTACRANTS, ETC., USING 
FoKEIGN Eccs TO P.osT NoTicE OF Ust.-A statute of Washington regulates the 
sale, labelling and marking of eggs. After dealing with the branding cf col.cl 
storage, preserved, and eggs imported from foreign countries, the statute 
provides that all restaurants, hotels, ba,keries, and confectioners using· or 
serving foreign eggs must place a sign in some conspicuous place, to read, 
"We use foreign eggs." In an action for a permanent injunction to restrain 
the enforcement of the provision set 'out above, on: the ground of unconstitu-
tionality, held, the act being within the police pow.er of the state and not regu-
lating foreign commerce, is constitutional. Parrot & Co. v. Benson, {Wash., 
1921), I94 Pac. g86. 
The courts will· not declare a statute invalid unless its conflict with the 
constitution is plain. Atclzi11son T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Mathews, 174 U.S.!)(); 
Ilomc Tel. Co. v. Los A11ge/es, 211 U. S. 265. The statute in the principal case 
was sustained on the ground that it was a proper police measure, intended 
for the protection of the public from the sale of stale and unwholesome eggs 
and was not an unjust discrimination nor an unreasonable restriction. The 
police power includes within its scope not only P.Ublic health, morals and safety 
but also regulations designed to promote the general welfare, prosperity and 
the public convenience. Chicago R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561; Noble State 
Ba11k v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104. That trades may be regulated in the exercise 
of the police power is well settled. Scl1111idfager y. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578. 
Plainly a regulation protecting the public from the sale of unwholesome eggs 
is a proper police measure. But to constitute a valid exercise of the police 
power the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the 
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. There must be a real 
and substantial relation between the means used and the purpose to be ac-
complished. I4awton, v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133· However, if a state of facts 
can be reasonably presumed to exist which would justify the act, the court 
must presume that it did exist and that the law was passed for that reason. 
Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 6o6. 
In the principal case there were-facts tending to show that eggs imported 
from China were produced and shipped under conditions if not unwholesome, 
that at least might justify the consumer in preferring domestic eggs to such 
foreign eggs. The sta.ute in question requires identification of imported eggs 
and permits such choice. It does not, however, effect its purpose-the protec-
tion of the public from the sale of unwholesome eggs. It does uot even tend 
to accomplish that end. Imported eggs are not necessarily stale nor unwhole-
some. Nor are domestic eggs' necessarily fresh and wholesome. While it is 
true that a classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against 
the equal protection clause merely because it is not made. with mathematical 
nicety, (LindSC:J.' v. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61), still there must be some 
reasonable basis and that is lacking in this case. The basis of the restriction 
is the place from which the article comes, not the distance nor the time con-
sumed in shipment. The quality and purity of the eggs is not the real aim 
of the law, nor does it accomplish that purpose. The act bas no substantial 
relation to the objects for which the police power may be validly exercised 
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and moreover it invades the rights of the individual to engage freely in busi-
ness; for those reasons it is involid. Frost v. Chicago, 178 Ill. 250. The real 
}lurpose of the law seems to be to aid the domestic producer of eggs, by 
appealing to the prejudices of people against eggs produced in a foreign land. 
The state may not under the guise of the police power enact laws which do 
not pertain to police pµrposes, but which do impose onerous burdens on busi-
ness. E~ parte Hayden, 147 Cal 649. Upon these grounds a similar statute 
regulating the sale of foreign eggs was held unconstitutional in Matter of 
Foley, 172 Cal. 7# In State v. Jacobson, 8o Or. 648, such a statute was held 
to be unconstitutional as being in conflict with the commerce clause of the 
constitution. 
The power to regulate foreign commerce is exclusively in the Congress 
of the United States. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259- The statute in 
the principal case deals with a recognized commodity of international com-
merce and plac;:es restrictions upon its saie. It discriminates against goods of 
foreign origin by reason of their origin alone. The restrictions placed upon 
the sale of foreign eggs must of necessity interfere and obstruct the freedom 
of transportation and exchange between this and foreign countries, which 
such articles on their merits would otherwise have. Such state interference 
with foreign commerce is unjustified. W elto11 v. Misso1iri, 91 U. S. 275. The 
decision in the principal case in dealing with this proble~ of interference with 
foreign commerce, considered the egg after reaching the hotel or restaurant, 
as no longer an· article of foreign commerce. But unless the commerce clause 
could prevent such discrimination, the power of Congress to regulate foreign 
commerce exclusively would be incapable of enforcement. The power, how-
ever, does reach to the interior of every state so far as it is necessary to 
prot~t products of other countries from discrimination by reason of their 
foreign origin. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 4J4. To enforce this statute 
would be in effect t-0 permit the state to discriminate against or prohibit in-
directly the importation of foreign eggs. This cannot be allowed. Collins v. 
New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30. The powe~ of Congress to regulate commerce 
does not effect the surrender of the p"olice power of the state. Where the 
purpose is proper and the law does not directly interfere with commerce, the 
police power of the state may be exercised. Thus a Massachusetts statute to 
prevent the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine colored to imitate butter, 
was held a valid exercise of the police power to prevent deception and cheat-
ing of the public, although it did interfere indirectly with interstate commerce. 
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461. As shown, there was no valid exer-
cise of the police· power in the form of the statute involved in the principal 
case, therefore the interference with foreign commerce there attempted was 
unjustified. The W'ashington court has failed utterly to apply properly the 
well defined principles controlling the exercise of the police power and the 
interference with foreign commerce by the state. The decisions in Matter 
of Folty, supm, and State v. Ja,cobson, supra, holding contra to the principal 
case, are sound. J. P. T. 
